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In this paper, we propose a new semiparametric varying coecient model which extends
the existing semi-parametric varying coecient models to allow for a time trend regressor with
smooth coecient function. We propose to use the local linear method to estimate the coef-
ﬁcient functions and we provide the asymptotic theory to describe the asymptotic distribution
of the local linear estimator. We present an application to evaluate credit rationing in the U.S.
credit market. Using U.S. monthly data (1952.1-2008.1) and using inﬂation as the underlying
state variable, we ﬁnd that credit is not rationed for levels of inﬂation that are either very low or
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the Mundell-Tobin eect holds.
Key words: non-stationarity; semi-parametric smooth coecients; nonlinearity; credit ra-
tioning
JEL codes: C14, C22, E44
The corresponding author. E-mail: jgu@walton.uark.edu1 Introduction
Recently, semiparametric varying coecient modeling techniques have attracted much attention
among econometricians and statisticians. For theoretical development of varying coecient
model with independent and stationary data, see Cai, Fan and Li (2000), Fan, Yao and Cai
(2003), Li, Huang, Li and Fu (2002), among others. The semiparametric varying coecient
model speciﬁcation has been used in various empirical studies. For example, Chou, Liu and
Huang (2004) examined health insurance and savings over life cycle. Savvides, Mamuneas and
Stengos (2006) studied the problem of economic development and the return to human capital.
Stengos and Zacharias (2006) investigated the intertemporal pricing and price discrimination of
the personal computer market. Jansen, Li, Wang and Yang (2008) studied the impact of U.S.
ﬁscal policy on stock market performance.
In this paper, we propose a new method of estimation and inference that extends the appli-
cation of semiparametric smooth coecients models to the case where the dependent variable
is non-stationary because it contains a time trend component regressors. Let Yt denote the non-
stationarydependentvariable(Yt containsatimetrend), and Xt bethesetofstationaryregressors.
We also deﬁne Zt as a stationary underlying state variable. To capture the time trend behavior
of Yt, we use a time trend, denoted by t, as part of the data generating process. In this paper, we
propose two alternative empirical speciﬁcations of a semiparametric smooth coecients model.
These speciﬁcations vary in their treatment of the time trend.
We consider a semiparametric model which includes a stationary vector variable Xt1 and a
time trend as regressors, all of them have varying smooth coecients. The model is given by
Yt = XT
t (Zt) + ut  XT
t1(1)(Zt) + t(2)(Zt) + ut; (1)
where XT
t = (XT
t1;Xt2) = (Xt1;t) is of dimension 1  d, (1)() and (2)() are smooth functions of
Zt and they are of dimension (d   1)  1 and 1  1, respectively. We assume that Xt1, Zt and ut
are both stationary, while Yt is non-stationary due to its time trend component.
Model (1) diers from the varying coecient model considered by Cai, Li and Park (2009),
1and Xiao (2009) who consider the case that Xt contains integrated non-stationary regressors (i.e.,
regressors having unit roots), while our model considers a time trend non-stationary regressor.
We also consider a simpler model in which the trend variable enters the model linearly
Yt = XT
t1(1)(Zt) + 
t + ut; (2)
where 
 is a constant coecient.
We subsequently discuss and apply this new semiparametric speciﬁcation to evaluate em-
pirically whether credit are rationed in the U.S. credit market. We start with a simple model
with frictions in credit markets. We use general equilibrium techniques and consider a nonlinear
structural model that has the micro-foundations required for monetary growth economies. This
model builds, in a simpliﬁed way, on Hernandez-Verme (2004) and Azariadis and Smith (1996),
and it has testable implications with respect to whether credit is rationed or not in equilibrium.
We go directly from the model and its testable implications through estimation and inference.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our theoretical
econometrics model and we propose to use a local linear estimation method to estimate the
coecient functions. We derive the asymptotic distribution for our proposed estimator. Section
3 presents an empirical application. We study a simple model of credit rationing, discuss its
testable implication and then use a varying coecient speciﬁcation to investigate whether US
credit market is rationed. Section 4 concludes the paper. The proof of the asymptotic results is
given in the Appendix.
2 Estimating the Semiparametric Smooth Coecients
Model
Our semiparmetric varying coecient model is given by
Yt = XT
t (Zt) + ut = XT
t1(1)(Zt) + t(2)(Zt) + ut; t = 1;:::;n; (3)
where Yt, Zt and ut are scalars, and Xt = (XT
t1;Xt2)T = (XT
t1; t). We only consider the scalar
Zt case since the extension to multivariate Zt involves fundamentally no new ideas but only
2complicated notations.
2.1 Local Linear Estimation
We use a local linear approximation to approximate the unknown coecient function. When Zt
is close to z, we use (z) + 0(z)(Zt   z) to approximate (Zt), where 0(z) = d(z)=dz. The local









t 0   (Zt   z)XT
t 1
i2
Kh(Zt   z); (4)
where Kh(u) = h 1K(u=h), K() is a kernel function and h is the smoothing parameter. It is
well known thatb 0 = b (z) estimates (z) andb 1 = b 0(z) estimates 0(z). (4) has the closed form























Yt Kh(Zt   z); (5)
where A
2 = AAT. We present the asymptotic theory regarding ˆ (z) in the next subsection.
2.2 Asymptotic Properties
Recall that ˆ (z) = (ˆ (1)(z)T; ˆ (2)(z))T , and that ˆ (1)(z) and ˆ (2)(z) are the coecients of X1t and t,
respectively. We will show that ˆ (1)(z) and ˆ (2)(z) have dierent convergence rates. To establish





, where Id 1 is an identity matrix of
dimension d 1. We also deﬁne M0(Zt) = fz(Zt)E(Xt1XT
t1jZt); M1(Zt) = (1=2)fz(Zt)E(Xt1jZt) and







We also make the following assumptions.
(A1) (i) (Xt1;Zt) is a strictly stationary -mixing process with size  2(2 + )= for some  > 0,
ut is a martingale dierent process satisfying E(u2
t jFt) = E(u2
t ) = 2
u, and E(u4
t jFt) < 1, where
Ft is the sigma ﬁeld generated by fXs1;Zsgt
s= 1. (iii) () has a bounded and continuous second
order derivative function.
3(A2) (i) K() is a bounded symmetric density function with
R
K(v)v2dv = 2(K) being a ﬁnite
positive constant. (ii) h ! 0, nh2 ! 1 and nh5 = O(1) as n ! 1.
The above regularity conditions are quite standard and provide sucient conditions to es-
tablish our Theorem 1 below. However, they are not the weakest possible conditions. For ex-
ample, the conditional homoskedastic error assumption can be relaxed to allow for conditional
heteroskedastic errors.




b (z)   (z)   h22(K)00(z)
i
! N(0;(z)) in distribution;
where 2 =
R
K(v)v2dv, 00(z) = d2(z)=dz2, N(0;(z)) denotes a normal distribution with
mean zero and variance matrix given by (z) = 2
u0(K)S(z) 1, 0(K) =
R
K2(v)v2dv , and S(z)
is deﬁned in (6).
Detailed proof of the above Theorem is provided in Appendix A.
Note that Theorem 1 shows that while the coecient of Xt1 has the standard rate of con-
vergence: ˆ (1)(z)   (1)(z) = Op(h2 + (nh) 1=2) because var(ˆ (1)(z)) = O((nh) 1), the coecient
function of t has a much faster rate of convergence: ˆ (2)(z) (2)(z) = Op(h2+(n3h) 1=2) because
var(ˆ (2)(z)) = O((n3h) 1) (due to the extra n factor at the lower diagonal position in matrix Dn).
3 An Empirical Application
3.1 A Simple Model of Credit Rationing
In this section, we present a simple model of the ﬁnancial system that can be used to evaluate
whether credit is rationed or not. In this economy, there is an adverse selection problem in the
credit market. Depending on the state of the economy, the Incentive Compatibility constraint
associated with this problem may or may not be binding. We let rt denote the real gross interest
rate on loans. Borrowers and Lenders each take rt as given.
We introduce reserve requirement as a ﬁrst building block of the monetary policy in this
economy. In general, these required reserves must be held in the form of currency, either do-
4mestic or foreign. It seems reasonable to assume that the reserve requirement is binding, so
henceforth we suppose that this is the case.
The second building block is the evolution of the money supply. The monetary authority
directly control over the domestic money supply. The evolution of the money supply Mt is given
by
Mt = (1 + )Mt 1; (7)
where  >  1 is the rate of money growth set exogenously by the Federal Reserve System. We
use t =
pt pt 1
pt 1 to denote the domestic rate of inﬂation at date t.
Clearing in the Credit Market with a binding reserve requirement and the evolution of the
money supply then requires that the equilibrium real interest rate on loans rt is an increasing
function of t, the inﬂation rate at time t highlighting the role of the reserve requirement. The
intuition behind this result is as follows: higher inﬂation rates reduce the return that banks re-
ceive from their currency-reserves holdings, and rt must increase for banks to be able to compete
for deposits in the market.
3.1.1 General Equilibrium and Alternative Credit Regimes
In this section, we show that the combination of rt and other state variables will determine
whether the Incentive Compatibility constraint binds or not in equilibrium, which will in turn
control the regime that a particular allocation belongs to. There are two possible credit regimes
that we discuss in detail below: a Walrasian regime - where credit is not rationed - and a Private
Information regime - where credit is rationed.
A Walrasian Regime
We say that the economy is in a Walrasian regime at a particular point in time when a Wal-
rasian equilibrium occurs. Let kW
t denote the per capita capital stock when the economy is in a
Walrasian equilibrium at date t. The economy is in a Walrasian equilibrium when
f0(kW
t ) = rt; (8)
5where f0(k) = df(k)=dk. This condition is fairly common in standard economic theory. In
this particular model, when condition (8) holds, the Incentive Compatibility constraint is not
binding, meaning that the private information problem is not binding either. In this case, we say
that credit is not rationed, since borrowers may borrow as much as they can at the equilibrium
interest rate rt.
In terms of comparative statics, we observe that when credit is not rationed, increases in rt
translate into increases in the marginal product of capital. Given standard decreasing marginal
products, then, kW






, and, thus, output per capita in a Walrasian equilibrium is also decreasing in rt.
In summary, an increase in the equilibrium interest rate on loans reduces output per capita in
equilibria where credit is not rationed.
A Private Information Regime
When a Private Information equilibrium occurs at a particular date, we say that the economy
is in a Private Information regime, and we observe that the link between the marginal product of
capital and the market interest rate on loans is broken. Let kP
t denote the capital stock per capita
when the economy is in a Private Information equilibrium at date t. The economy is in a Private
Information equilibrium when the following inequality holds:
f0(kP
t ) > rt: (9)
When Condition (9) holds, borrowers are willing to borrow arbitrarily large amounts at the
market interest rate on loans rt. In such a situation, lenders must make the Incentive Compati-
bility constraint binding to avoid potential default problems, and this causes Credit Rationing.
Under the circumstances mentioned above, an increase in rt serves the purpose of relaxing
the Incentive Compatibility constraint, increasing the amount of credit available and borrowed
and, thus, kP
t . Thus, kP






, and output in a Private Information equilibrium is also increasing in rt. In
summary, an increase in the equilibrium interest rate on loans increases output when credit is
6rationed, and a short-run version of Mundell-Tobin eect prevails.
3.1.2 Testable Implications of the Model
We can use a reduced-form equation that is consistent with the model presented above and that
can also be used to evaluate whether credit is rationed or not. In particular, for the sake of
parsimony, we use the following semi-parametric equation:
yt = 1(t) + 2(t)rt + 3(t)t + ut; (10)
wheretheunderlyingstatevariableistheinﬂationrate, while1(t), 2(t)and3(t)aresmooth
coecient functions that depend on the inﬂation rate t. By using this ﬂexible speciﬁcation, we
can evaluate whether credit rationing is present or not, together with the region of the state-space
for which this is true. In particular, let b 2(t) denote the estimated function of 2(t) = @yt=@rt.
Then, the regions in which b 2(t) > 0 is associated with Private Information equilibria and,
thus, credit will be rationed. The complementary regions in whichb 2(t) < 0 is associated with
Walrasian equilibria and credit will not be rationed.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
3.2.1 Model Speciﬁcation
We start from the simple linear regression model
Yt = XT
t  + ZT
t 
 + ut; t = 1;2;:::;n; (11)
where XT
t is 1  d vector with one component being 1, ZT
t is a 1  q vector, and  and 
 are
constant parameter vectors with dimensions d  1 and q  1, respectively. Equation (11) will be
the benchmark against which we will compare our results.
Our choice of speciﬁcation of the empirical model is consistent with the simple theoretical
framework that we presented in the previous section. Thus, we propose to use the following
semi-parametric varying coecient speciﬁcation:
Yt = XT
t (Zt) + ut; t = 1;2;:::;n; (12)
7where the coecient function (Zt) is a d  1 vector of unspeciﬁed smooth functions of the
underlying state variable Zt.
Thismodelspeciﬁcationallowsforamoreﬂexiblefunctionalformandalsoavoidsthe“curse
of dimensionality” associated with a fully nonparametric model. Under the assumption that
model (12) is correctly speciﬁed, E(utjXt;Zt) = 0. Pre-multiplying both sides of ( 12) with Xt,




t jZt = z)
i 1
E(XtYtjZt = z): (13)
We next replace the conditional mean function in (13) by some nonparametric estimator, say
by the local linear kernel estimator, and we obtain a feasible estimator of (z).
In our model, the dependent variable is the industrial production per capita, which we denote
as Yt. Since the industrial production per capita has an obvious time trend, the explanatory
variable Xt includes the time trend t. Xt also contains the growth rate of the real gross interest
rate on loans ln(rt), since the real interest rate is nonstationary. The explanatory state variable
Zt is the inﬂation rate t. Since the non-stationarity of industrial production per capita is caught
by the time trend, we redeﬁne the coecient smooth function of t associated with the time
trend t as 3(t). So, we can rewrite the model in (12) as
Yt = 1(t) + 2(t)ln(rt) + 3(t)t + ut: (14)
The coecient for the intercept, 1(t), is a function of the underlying state-variable t
(inﬂation rate), and so is the coecient 2(t) that measures the eect of the real interest rate on
the industrial production per capita at date t.
We obtain an alternative model speciﬁcation when the time trend t enters the model linearly,
which means that the eect of the time trend is constant and independent of the state variable t.
So, the smooth coecient function of t, 3(t), reduces to a constant parameter 
. Under these
conditions, the alternative nonlinear model with constant time trend becomes
Yt = 
t + 1(t) + 2(t)ln(rt) + ut (15)
8The corresponding linear regression model (11) is given by,
Yt = 1;0 + 2;0 ln(rt) + 3;0 t + 4;0 t + ut; (16)
where j;0s (j = 1;2;3;4) are constant coecients.
In the remainder of the paper we will refer the simple linear model in (16) as model 1, the
partially linear varying coecient model (15) as model 2, and the general varying coecient
model in (14) as model 3.
3.2.2 Model Speciﬁcation Testing
As is standard in the literature, we ﬁrst test whether the varying coecient models 2 and 3
represent the data signiﬁcantly better than the standard linear OLS model or model 1.
Westartfromthebenchmarkmodel1, alinearregressionmodelwithtimetrend, asdescribed
in (16). We use the Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) test as suggested by Cai, Fan and Yao
(2000) to conduct model speciﬁcation tests. Particularly, we test whether the linear speciﬁcation
model is adequate for the data, with the linear model as the null hypothesis and one of the














where b ut is the residual from the null hypothesis linear model, and ˜ ut is the residual from the
alternative smooth coecient model. Typically, one rejects the null hypothesis of linearity when
large values for the GLR statistic are obtained.
We now turn to explain the multiple steps involved in this test. Cai, Fan and Yao (2000)
suggest using a bootstrap approach to evaluate the p-value of the test. In particular, they boot-
strapped the centralized residuals from the nonparametric ﬁt instead of the linear ﬁt, because the
nonparametric estimate of the residuals is consistent under both the null and alternative hypothe-
ses. We use u
t to denote the bootstrap error - which is obtained following the ﬁtted residual from
the varying coecient model. The bootstrap error u
t follows the ‘wild’ bootstrap distribution
9conditions (see Cai et al (2000) for more details). We then obtain the GLR statistics and critical
values via the following ﬁve steps:
Step 1: For each t = 1;2;:::;n, we generate values for u
t that satisﬁes the ‘wild’ bootstrap
distribution conditions. We then compute y
t = XT
t b (t) + u
t, where XT
t = (1; ln(rt); t) for
t = 1;2;:::;n.
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t = (1; ln(rt); t; t ) for t = 1;2;:::;n. Next, we obtain the estimated bootstrap OLS
residuals by usingb u
t = y
t   ˜ XT
t b 
ols.
Step 3: We obtain the kernel estimator ofb (t) using the bootstrap sample, as
b (t) =
0



































Step 5: We repeat steps 1- 4 a number of times, say B times, and obtain the empirical
distribution of the B test statistics of fGLR
n;jgB
j=1. Let GLR
n;() denote the th percentile of the





In order to focus on the short run relationships described by our theoretical model, we use
monthly data. The following variables were obtained from the FRED data set of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis: the industrial production index (IPt), the bank prime loan rate (It),
the CPI (Pt), and population (POPt ). The data spans from January 1952 to January 2008 with
10a total of 673 monthly observations. We calculate the series of industrial production per capita,





The population is expressed in thousands of inhabitants. Therefore, IPPt is an index of
industrialproduction permillion people, and wefound it tobe nonstationary. Itis stationaryafter






Next, we adjusted the Bank Prime Loan Rate series (It) by the inﬂation rate (t), obtaining the
real gross interest rate rt, by using the formula rt =
1+It
1+t. We found the real gross interest rate,
rt, to be non stationary. However, this estimation method requires stationary covariates, and
we proceeded to ﬁnd a stationary representation of this series. Thus, accordingly, we took the
log dierence of the real gross interest rate, ln(rt) = ln(rt)   ln(rt 1) and found ln(rt) to be
stationary.
3.3.2 Results of Model Speciﬁcation Tests
For the model speciﬁcation test, we use the methodology introduced in section 3.2.2. The null
hypothesis of the GLR test is that the linear model, model 1, ﬁts the data best. We use dierent
types of nonlinear models as alternative hypothesis: model 2 and model 3.
In the Table 1 below, we present the bootstrap critical values in columns three through six
for dierent nominal values. In the sixth column, we display the the GLR statistics, and column
seven reports the p-values. The p-value for the linear model against model 3 is less than 0.001,
while the p-value for the linear model against model 2 equals 0.003. The testing results indicate
the existence of strong nonlinearities in the output, inﬂation and interest rate relationship.
Table 1: Results of Model Speciﬁcation Tests
Models Critical Values GLR Prob.
1% 5% 10% 20%
Models 1 v.s. 2 0.041 0.036 0.033 0.029 0.046 0.003
Models 1 v.s. 3 0.053 0.049 0.045 0.040 0.088 0.000
11Our comparisons of model 2 and model 3 each against the linear model have thus veriﬁed
the presence of strong nonlinearity. However, we also need to take a step further: to treat model
2 as the null model and test it against the more general model 3. To do so, we used a test statistic
that was based on a similar GLR methodology (and a bootstrap procedure). The testing result
show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that model 2 is adequate against model 3 at any
conventional signiﬁcant level. Therefore, our econometrics analysis will be mainly based on the
more parsimony model 2 in the remaining parts of this paper, though we will also present the
estimation result of model 3 in the Appendix B for readers’ convenience.
3.3.3 Estimation Results
In this section, we discuss the main traits of the estimated coecient functions as well as the
economic intuition behind them. We present empirical evidence on the scope for credit rationing
in the U.S. credit market.
The Estimated Coecient Functions
We present the estimation results of the partially linear varying coecients model 2. Here,
we focus on the nonlinearities displayed by the estimated coecient functions with respect to
the inﬂation rate. Figure 1 displays the estimated coecient functions of model 2. Recall that
model 2 is represented by (15). We will denote the corresponding estimated functions by ˆ 
,
ˆ 1(t) and ˆ 2(t). The estimated value for the constant parameter 
 is ˆ 
 = 0:0004, with an
associated standard error of 2:77  10 6. So that ˆ 
 is (highly) signiﬁcantly dierent from zero.
This is expected because there is an obvious trend behavior in the output data.
The ﬁrst panel in Figure 1 displays ˆ 1(t). In this model, ˆ 1(t) represents the varying
intercept. In a standard linear regression, this coecient would be constant and independent of
the inﬂation rate: its diagram would take the form of a perfectly horizontal line for all values of
t. However, we observe that the shape of ˆ 1(t) is somewhat closer to a V shape with ˆ 1(t)
taking positive values between 0:095 and 0:118. Thus, 1(t) is a nonlinear function in t is
supported by Figure 1.
The second panel in Figure 1 displays the estimated coecient function ˆ 2(t) and it is of


























Figure 1: Coecients of Model 2, Local Linear Estimator
particular importance to our analysis. One of the main hypotheses from our simple theoretical
model is that the interest rate on loans having a nonlinear eect on output per capita and this
eect depending on the level of the inﬂation rate. It is apparent that our hypothesis was veriﬁed
andthattheeectofrt onYt variessigniﬁcantlyfordierentvaluesoft, givingrisetothreshold-
eects. One can see that the second panel in Figure 1 looks (roughly) like an inverse U (or V)
shape showing an obvious sign of nonlinearity.
Notice that the following transpires: for t 2 ( 1; 0:6) and for t 2 (1:3;1:8], the eect of
the interest rate on output per capita is negative. The economy is in Walrasian regime. Credit is
not rationed.
When t 2 ( 0:6;1:3), the eect of the interest rate on output per capita is positive. The
economy is in Private Information regime. Credit is rationed.
Evidence on the Scope for Credit Rationing
Most of the previous research on credit rationing in the U.S. credit market has focused on the
micro perspective. For example, Berger and Udell (1992) is based on the information of com-
mercial bank loan contracts; Petrick (2005) is based on the household data; Duca and Rosenthal
(1991) investigates credit rationing in the mortgage market.
In this paper, we supply a new perspective of how to look at the credit market at the aggre-
gate level, one that allows for private information and expectations to eectively constrain this
market. As we will show next, we ﬁnd that the empirical evidence supports this opinion. In
particular, we estimate the Walrasian region and Private Information region based on short-run
13macro data.
Our results from Figure 2 indicates that there exist two threshold, L and H, for inﬂation.
The estimated values of L and H are  0:6% and 1:3%, respectively. Only when the monthly
inﬂation rate is suciently low (i.e. t <  0:6%) or high enough (i.e. t > 1:3%,) and thus
credit need not be rationed. However, for monthly inﬂation rates between  0:6% and 1:3%, the
incentive compatibility constraint bind and reducing the amount of credit available in the market.
Moreover, the severity of the adverse selection problem, seems to vary with the inﬂation rate as
well, explaining why the peaks occur in the function ˆ 2 (t). As a ﬁnal conclusion, we have that
the “indirect” eect of t and Yt is nonlinear and non-monotonic, and it varies signiﬁcantly for
dierent values of the monthly inﬂation rate indicating to some extent the information problem
in the U.S. credit market.
The analysis of the eects of inﬂation on output per capita is also of the utmost importance
in Macroeconomics (see Fisher (1993), Bullard and Keating (1995), Khan and Senhadji (2001)
and Drukker et al (2008).) Our approach diers from the standard in the use of semiparametric
estimation techniques, but our results are still comparable with the literature: we can also obtain
functions that describe the magnitude of the impact that t has on Yt, given the nonlinear eects
of inﬂation.
Marginal Eects
We analyze the marginal eect of inﬂation as the partial derivative function of Yt with respect
to t keeping the interest rate rt at a ﬁxed value. When rt is ﬁxed we have ln(rt) = 0. As a







One advantage of using the local linear estimation method is that, one also obtains the deriva-
tive estimates at the same time which we plot in Figure 2. From Figure 2, we can observe the
marginal eects vary nonlinearly with the inﬂation rate. For example, when the initial inﬂa-
tion rate belongs to the interval [ 0:8%; 0:5%), an increase of inﬂation of one percent point
reduces absolute output by 0:03 percentage points on average. However, as the initial inﬂation
14rate changes and it belongs, say, to the intervals [0:0%;0:5%) or [0:5%;1:0%); the eect on
output is an increase of 0:0075 and 0:012 percentage points on average, respectively.
We can make three points from these results. First, the partial marginal eects increase
with the inﬂation rate. Second, negative partial marginal eects are associated with rates of
inﬂation that are low enough. And, third, positive partial marginal eects are observed for rates
of inﬂation that are suciently high.



























Figure 2: Marginal Eects with Fixed Interest Rate
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the standard semiparametric smooth coecients model to allow for
nonstationary dependent variables by introducing a time trend among the regressors. We ﬁnd the
varying coecient associated with the time trend t and other stationary regressors have dierent
convergence rates. We establish the asymptotic properties of the new estimation.
We applied this new technique of estimation and inference to evaluate whether credit ra-
tioning is present in the U.S. credit market. We directly test for the following hypotheses: 1)
Inﬂation is a key state variable that has nonlinear eects on output per capita; 2) The real interest
rate on loans has signiﬁcant eects on output per capita that are nonlinear as well; 3) The non-
linear coecient associated with the interest rate can help detect the presence of credit rationing
in the U.S. market.
15We found that the estimated smooth varying coecients displayed strong nonlinearities with
respect to the inﬂation rate, verifying the adequacy of having used a semiparametric smooth
coecient model, and also conﬁrming our hypotheses. We showed that, in general, the marginal
eects of inﬂation on output per capita can be either positive or negative. Moreover, the marginal
eect function is a monotonically increasing and concave function of t which display positive
values when the monthly inﬂation rate is high enough, but negative values otherwise.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1:





































17Thus,b (z) andb 0(z) can be re-expressed as follows:
Hn
  b (z)
b 0(z)
!















where S n = H 1
n AnH 1
n , Zt;z;h = (Zt   z)=h. By adding and subtracting terms we obtain
Yt = XT








Plug (A.2) into (A.1), and we have,
Hn
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0(z)(Zt   z)
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S n;0(z) S n;1(z)S n;1(z)
S n;1(z) S n;2(z)
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t1jZt), M1(Zt) = (1=2)fz(Zt)E(Xt1jZt) and M2(Zt) = (1=3)fz(Zt):
By noting that Xt1 and Zt are stationary and using the standard change-of-variable and a Taylor’s
expansion argument, we know that n 2 Pn
t=1 t = (1=2)+O(n 1) and n 3 Pn
t=1 t2 = (1=3)+O(n 1).

































vj M0(z)K(v)dv + O(h2)




According to the same step as above, we have
E[Fn;j;1(z)] = M1(z)j(K) + o(1); (A.4)
E[Fn;j;2(z)] = M2(z)j(K) + o(1): (A.5)
By the kernel theory for the stationary mixing case (see Theorem 1 of Cai, Fan and Yao





= O((nh) 1) = o(1):
Therefore,
Fn;j;l(z) = Ml(z)j(K) + op(1): (A.6)







By deﬁnition of S(z) above, together with equation (A.6), (A.4), ( A.5) and (A.3), we have
S n;j(z) = j(K)S(z) + op(1): (A.7)
19By noting that 0(K) = 1 and 1(K) = 0, we immediately obtain from the deﬁnition of S n(z)







 S(z) + op(1): (A.8)
From (A.8), we immediately obtain that
S n;0(z) 1 = S(z) 1 + op(1): (A.9)
S n;0(z) is the upper-left corner d  d matrix of S n(z). From (A.1), we have
Dn
h
b (z)   (z)
i
 L1n + L2n; (A.10)
where







t f(Zt)   (z)   (Zt   z)0(z)g;
and
L2n = S n;0(z) 1 n 1
n X
t=1

































Similar to (A.6), (A.4) and (A.5), by the kernel theory and an application of Taylor’s expansion,
it is easy to show that








20and Var[Gn;0(z)] = o(1), so that








Further, following the proof above, we can easily show that

























Plugging the above results into (A.12), we obtain






f1 + op(1)g: (A.13)
Substituting (A.13) into (A.11) and using (A.9) lead to
L1n = Dn h2 2(K)00(z)f1 + op(1)g;
Therefore,
D 1
n L1n = h22(K)00(z) + op(h2): (A.14)

































b (z)   (z)   h22(K)00(z) + op(h2)
i
= S n;0(z) 1 Tn(z): (A.15)
To prove the asymptotic normality of the left hand side of (A.15), it suces to establish the
asymptotic normality of Tn(z). Note that Tn;1 only involves stationary variables. Hence, by the
kernel estimation theory for stationary mixing data (see Theorem 2 of Cai, Fan and Yao (2000)











u0(K) M2(z)) = N(0;0(K)M2(z)): (A.17)
The covariance matrix is given by
Cov(Tn;1;Tn;2) = 2
uh 1E[Kh(Zt   z)Xt1(t=n)] = 2
u0(K)M1(z) + o(1):



















Appendix B: Estimation Results for Model 3
The Estimated Coecient Functions for Model 3 Figure 3 displays the three estimated
coecient functions in model 3, where we allowed for nonlinear eects from the time trend t,
as displayed in (14). We will refer to the associated coecients by using the notation ˜ 1(t),
˜ 2(t), and ˜ 3(t), where ˜ 3(t) is the nonlinear coecient associated with the time trend t, as
opposed to the constant ˆ 
 in model 2.
TheﬁrstpanelinFigure3illustratestheshapeoftheinterceptfunction ˜ 1(t)whichmayalso
be interpreted as the “direct” eect of inﬂation on output per capita. The general shape of ˜ 1(t)
is that of a letter U (as it was the case in model 2.) Notice that the the “direct” eects of inﬂation
on output per capita seem somewhat ampliﬁed in model 3: they lie in the interval [0:107;0:162]
whileinmodel2theyconcentratedinstead in[0:095;0:118). Thereadermay noticethat, for very
negative inﬂation rates (i.e. between -1.0 and -0.5,) higher inﬂation has a positive but decreasing
contribution to output, reaching a plateau earlier than in model 2. Observation indicates that,
for t 2 [ 0:5;0:0], the direct eect of inﬂation on output cannot be distinguished from zero,
22implying short-run monetary super-neutrality. Thus, in model 3, short-run monetary neutrality
is associated with t 2 [ 0:5;0:0], while model 2 displayed a similar eect for positive rates of
inﬂation that were close enough to zero. As the monthly inﬂation rate continues to increase in
the interval (0:0;1:8], the direct contribution of inﬂation on output increases as well, with the
exception of the interval [1:45;1:55]. In summary, very similar conclusions can be drawn about
the direct eects that inﬂation has on production per capita in both models.
Next, in the second panel of Figure 3, we observe that ˜ 2(t) -the coecient function as-
sociated with rt- is almost identical to its counterpart ˆ 2(t) in model 2 . Obviously, the same
intuition applies as to its relation to the availability of loanable funds.













































Figure 3: Coecients of Model 3, Local Linear Estimator
The third panel in Figure 3 displays the estimated coecient function ˜ 3(t). The latter
seems to suggest that the time trend t also exhibits signiﬁcant nonlinear and non-monotonic
eects on Yt that depend upon the initial inﬂation rate. However, noticing that the coecient
function ˜ 3(t) has a scale that is order of magnitudes smaller than ˜ 1(t) and ˜ 2(t). Therefore,
nonlinearity in 3() is negligible compared with those presetned in 1() and 2(). This is
consistent with our earlier testing result which suggests that model 2 is adequate against model
3.
23